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Abstract
Research summary: Using detailed ownership and nancial information from a large sample of
owner-managed private rms in three Western European countries, this paper examines the relationship
between CEOs age and rms performance. Tracking rms over time, we nd that as a CEO ages, the
rm experiences lower investment, lower sales growth and lower protability, but also higher probability
of survival, suggesting a trade-o¤between the managerial approaches of younger and older CEOs. These
results are stronger in industries more reliant on human capital, such as service and creative industries.
Our evidence also suggests that regional nancial development moderates the relationship between a
CEOs age and a rms performance by facilitating the reallocation of assets from rms owned by older
CEOs to rms owned by younger CEOs.
Managerial summary: How do management styles change as CEOs grow older? Using a large
rm-level dataset, we examine the behavior and performance of rms with CEOs of di¤erent ages. We
nd that as a CEO grows older, rm investment, growth and protability decline, but probability of
survival increases. The results are stronger in industries where human capital and creativity are more
important. Regional nancial development moderates the age-performance relationship by facilitating
reallocation of assets from rms with old CEOs to rms with younger CEOs. Our ndings suggest
that management styles change with age, as older CEOs tend to emphasize survival at the expense of
higher prots and faster growth.
Keywords: CEOs age, closely held rms, rm growth, nancial development.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of rm growth is a central goal of organization theory and strategic
management (Penrose, 1959; Roberts, 2004). Factors that inuence rm growth can be internal to
the rm, including the quality of its management, the CEOs strategic vision, the rms technological
capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Lucas, 1978; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Baum and Locke, 2004; Van den
Steen, 2005; Thornhill, 2006), or external, such as the countrys level of nancial development (which
a¤ects a rms access to funds) or the competitiveness of the industry (Scherer, 1980; Davidsson, 1989;
Carter and Van Auken, 2005; Hvide and Moen, 2010). In this paper, we examine how patterns of rm
growth and performance are related to an important managerial characteristic, CEOs age.
The upper echelons perspective holds that top managers, both individually and as a team, exert a
signicant inuence on rm strategies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Hambrick,
2007; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009) and nds that the demographic proles of executives,
including age, are correlated with rmsdecisions and performance (e.g., Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and
Sanders, 2004; Hambrick, 2005; Finkelstein et al., 2009). While an enormous volume of research in the
upper echelons literature has included CEO age as an important variable,1 the e¤ect of CEO age on rm
outcomes has not been investigated in su¢ cient depth. In this paper, we examine the moderating e¤ects of
external factors such as industry dynamism and creativity and also explore the role of nancial institutions
in alleviating the costs associated with old CEO age and succession. Another issue with existing research
is that it has mostly focused on large rms. However, strategic decisions in large rms are typically taken
by teams, and it is not clear what e¤ect a CEOs age might have when a team is composed of members
of di¤erent ages. Moreover, the separation of ownership and control in large corporations creates the
potential for agency problems, which could further complicate the interpretation of results. The present
paper sidesteps these complications by focusing on a relatively simple environment closely-held small
rms managed by their owners. For these rms, the owner-manager e¤ect is likely to be large.
We suggest that, in closely-held small rms, management youth is associated with higher growth
and performance. This could be due to younger CEOslower risk aversion (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003;
Sering, 2014), lower commitment to the status quo and higher probability of strategic change (e.g.,
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990), higher aspirations and preferences for growth (Gray, 2002; Ebner,
Freund and Baltes, 2006), and lower likelihood of adverse health events (Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and
Wolfenzon, 2018). The more aggressive behaviors of younger CEOs could also be associated with lower
1See, for example, Finkelstein et al. (2009) for a comprehensive literature review.
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survival of their rms. We further suggest that the e¤ects of a CEOs age will be moderated by external
factors. For example, rms operating in fast-moving industries can benet more from aggressive strategies
adopted by younger CEOs. The level of nancial development of a region (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) may
also moderate the relationship between CEOs age and rm growth and performance. Regional nancial
development can help improve the matching of owners with rms. Thus, more developed capital markets
may facilitate the transfer of ownership from older to younger CEOs, mitigating the e¤ects of old age.
We use a comprehensive dataset of 157,996 owner-managed rms from France, Italy, and the UK.
We dene a rm as owner-managed if its listed CEO is also its majority shareholder. To implement
this classication, we textually match the CEOs name to a list of shareholders. Our estimation sample
includes rms for which we can identify the leading shareholder (at least 50% of the equity) and determine
the CEOs age (in our data, age information is available for managers, but not for owners). Importantly,
we track rm growth and performance over time (20022012), which allows us to study the e¤ect of
the CEOs age on within-rm changes in rm growth and performance rather than making a cross-
sectional comparison of rms managed by CEOs of di¤erent ages. Within-rm analysis also mitigates
the unobserved heterogeneity problem. A potential concern is the extent to which our results can be
interpreted causally. To address this concern, we exploit several exogenous sources of variation (regional
level of nancial development, industry variation in creativity and dynamism) and perform instrumental
variable estimations. The results indicate that selection (low performing rms are disproportionately
managed by older owners) is not the main driver of our results.
Our paper makes four main contributions. First, we document the distribution of rm assets across
owner-manager age for a large fraction of the economy. The average e¤ective retirement age of workers
in the countries in our data is between 60 and 63 years of age.2 We nd that rms with a CEO who is at
least 60 years old control 28% of the assets and 26% of the employment and that rms with a CEO who
is at least 54 control 53% of the assets and 45% of the employment in our sample. These gures show
that rms with older CEOs are widespread and constitute a signicant share of economic activity within
small and closely-held rms.
Second, we demonstrate that the CEOs age is related to changes in rm growth and performance.
We nd that investment and sales growth slows down as CEOs age and is especially pronounced for CEOs
above 59. For instance, in a nine-year period, investment of CEOs above 59 decreases by 45% compared
to the youngest CEOs group; for CEOs aged 35 to 40, the decline is 7%. We also nd that performance
2The OECD computes the average e¤ective retirement age as the average age of exit from the labor force during a ve-year
period. See http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/average-e¤ective-age-of-retirement.htm
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declines with a CEOs age. In a nine-year period, rms managed by individuals older than 59 have a 13%
lower return on assets (ROA) compared to the youngest CEOs group; for CEOs between 35 and 40, ROA
declines only by 2.4%. We further show that this lower performance is partially o¤set by rm-specic
experience no signicant di¤erences in ROA are observed for CEOs with at least 12 years of tenure.
This is not the case for rm growth. The higher average growth and performance of rms led by younger
CEOs comes at the cost of higher risk of exit. We nd that rms with CEOs younger than 25 years old
are about 1.5 times more likely to exit from business than rms with CEOs older than 60. Overall, our
results indicate that older CEOs follow more conservative practices than their younger counterparts.
Third, we explore some of the mechanisms that may aggravate or alleviate the negative relationship
between a CEOs age and rm growth and performance. Our results highlight the role of human capital.
We nd that the decline in rm growth is greater in service industries, where human capital is arguably
very important, than in manufacturing industries, where human capital is arguably less important. Firms
in creative industries are particularly a¤ected by the presence of older CEOs. We observe that investment
and growth in sales is slower respectively by 10.4% and 5.3% for the oldest CEO group as compared to
the youngest CEO group. The decline in investment and sales growth is less pronounced for CEOs aged
40 to 59 in creative industries, but is still substantial, varying from 7% to 10% for investment and about
4% for sales.
Fourth, we examine contextual factors that can moderate the relationship between the CEOs age and
rm growth and performance. In particular, we focus on how regional nancial development may inuence
the propensity of older owner-managers to stay with or leave their rms. We nd that nancial markets
play an important role in moderating the negative e¤ect of older CEOs by facilitating their exit. First,
we nd a substantially higher prevalence of rms with older CEOs in regions with less developed nancial
markets, where the share of rms with CEOs who are at least 60 is 23%, relative to only 16% in regions of
high nancial development. Second, to explore what drives this striking di¤erence, we examine patterns
of ownership change across regions. In regions with more developed nancial markets, there are more
ownership changes, reducing the average CEOs age. Moreover, the negative relationship between age
and rm growth is weaker for rms in regions with more developed nancial markets. This may be driven
by a selection e¤ect of better or more motivated older CEOs choosing not to exit or by a moderating
e¤ect of access to nancial resources that allow older CEOs to maintain high growth rates. These results
highlight the role of nancial markets in moderating the central phenomenon documented in this paper
the negative relationship between CEOs age and rms growth by facilitating the allocation of assets
from rms with older CEOs to those with younger CEOs.
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We stress that our results should not be interpreted as showing that younger CEOs are better
than older CEOs in some objective sense. Our favored interpretation of the results is that younger CEOs
adopt higher risk strategies than their older, more conservative counterparts. Younger CEOs may perform
better, but this superior average performance may be associated with higher risk. This assertion is further
supported by higher exit rates observed for rms led by younger CEOs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and
outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses our estimation procedures.
Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Firm growth comes from expanding the current business or from exploiting new business opportunities.
The rate and direction of growth depend on the rms resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Teece,
Pisano, Shuen, 1997; Pettus, 2001; George, 2005). Upper echelons theory and the dynamic manager-
ial perspective emphasize the importance of managerial characteristics for rm growth (Penrose, 1959;
Hambrick and Manson, 1984; Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Teece, 2009).
However, the relationship between the age of managers and rm growth has not been extensively studied.
CEO age is commonly controlled for, but few studies have systematically explored the e¤ect of CEO
age on rm outcomes (Krause and Semadeni, 2014). Moreover, these studies do not examine the factors
moderating this relationship.
Existing studies suggest that CEO youth is associated with corporate growth (Hart and Mellors, 1970;
Child, 1974; Bhabra and Zhang, 2016). Firms with younger CEOs have been shown to exhibit higher
average growth, but also considerably more variation in their growth rates. Corporate growth could be
achieved through internal development, R&D, and mergers and acquisitions. Younger CEOs have been
shown to be more likely to invest in research and development (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Sering, 2014)
and more likely to acquire other rms (Matta and Beamish, 2008; Levi, Li and Zhang, 2010; Yim, 2013).
They open and close new plants more frequently (Li, Low, and Makhija, 2017), exhibit higher levels of
strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Huber et al., 1993; Yang, Zimmerman, and Jiang, 2011;
Datta, Rajagopalan, and Zhang, 2003; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010), and overall generate higher market
value (Bhabra and Zhang, 2016; Cline and Yore, 2016).
There are several reasons why rms with younger CEOs might exhibit higher growth and performance.
First, upper echelons literature has linked managerial youth with increased risk-taking propensity. While
inexperienced younger CEOs could nd it challenging to assess strategic risks associated with the alter-
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native risky actions, older CEOs, relying on their experience and past success in dealing with the similar
projects, should be better able to select the projects with the higher probability of success. Because older
managers, in particular owner-managers, may be more concerned with their future nancial security and
thus may try to reduce the risk of personal wealth destruction (Williamson, 1963; Sharma, Chrisman
and Chua, 1997),3 they could be unwilling to take risks associated with investments in new business de-
velopment or venturing activities as they approach retirement age (Morin and Suarez, 1983; Barker and
Mueller, 2002; Sering, 2014). As a result, older CEOs may behave cautiously and commit resources to
initiatives where the possible outcomes are fully understood to ensure survival of their rms and to leave
a legacy for future generations. A number of studies demonstrate that younger CEOs tend to pursue
riskier strategies (Karami, Analoui, and Kakabadse, 2006), including R&D investment (Sering, 2014),
and adopt riskier modes of entry into a new market, such as greenelds as opposed to joint ventures
(Herrman and Datta, 2006).
Second, older age is often associated with longer tenure in o¢ ce. As CEO tenure increases, rms
may become less willing to act on entrepreneurial initiatives. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that
longer CEO tenures are associated with rm performance deterioration. They o¤er a comprehensive
model of the seasons of a CEOs tenure. Seasons are characterized by several critical changes in CEO
attention and behavior. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that CEOs start their job with relatively
strong commitment to their paradigms, followed by a short period of experimentation and paradigm
recalibration and then further strengthening of the commitment to their updated paradigm. This process
is accompanied by gradual decrease in number of information sources used, and decline in quality of
information gathering and analysis (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Miller, 1991). Further, as CEO tenure
advances, level of task interest and the speed of acquiring task knowledge decrease, while a managers
power increases. This model of the seasons of a CEOs tenure is supported by Millers (1991) logic
that CEOs become stale in the saddle. Longer tenure also promotes managers greater psychological
commitment to the organizational status quo (Stevens, Beyer, and Trice, 1978; Hambrick and Mason,
1984; Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson, 1993).
Third, owner-managers of private rms may also choose to reduce their e¤ort in the rm in favor of
greater consumption and leisure (e.g., Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Gray,
2002; Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2002). For example, Kanfer and Ackerman (2004) argue that the
prospect of working seventy to eighty hours per week is manageable for younger adults, but is typically
3For example, the Federal Reserve Boards Survey of Consumer Finances for 2010 (SCF) nds that equity in the rm
represents on average 30% of the total wealth of the owner. Another 30% of their wealth comes from the labor income that
owners earn from their rms (e.g., Hamilton, 2000; SCF).
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becomes increasingly less attractive for middle-aged and older adults. Moreover, older CEOs may be
forced to reduce their e¤ort in the rm due to adverse health events. Bennedsen et al. (2018), for
instance, show that CEO hospitalization or death, the occurrence of which is likely to increase with age,
has a signicantly adverse e¤ect on rm protability, revenue and investment outcomes.
Finally, aspirations and personal goal orientations may change across adulthood. For example, Ebner
et al. (2006) nd that young adults report growth as their primary goals, while older adults lean toward
maintenance and loss prevention. Further, orientation toward prevention of loss is negatively correlated
with well-being of younger adults, but positively correlated with well-being of older adults. At the same
time, studies demonstrate that small business managersaspirations to expand their business activities
are positively related to actual growth (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Together these ndings suggest
that younger owners are most likely to seek nancial independence and self-fulllment, which may result
in higher rm growth and performance, while older owner-managers may desire to maintain stable income
with a exible lifestyle (Gray, 2002).
All of these considerations can lead to less aggressive strategies pursued by older CEOs and in turn
to lower average growth and performance of their rms. We therefore hypothesize
Hypothesis 1. A CEOs age is negatively associated with a rms (a) investment, (b) growth, (c)
performance.
At the same time, less aggressive strategies pursued by the older CEOs can be good for the rm.
Higher expected return is often associated with higher risk and, consequently, a higher risk of failure.
Hart and Mellors (1970) and Child (1974) show that rms led by younger CEOs exhibit higher return
volatility. It is consistent with the idea that inexperienced young CEOs do not know ex ante their own
entrepreneurial skills, but they learn over time by observing the returns to their activity. Therefore, the
observed volatility of returns is expected to be large when CEO is young, but due to selection induced by
learning it is expected to decrease as CEOs age (Campanale, 2010). Younger CEOs may also be willing
to take more risks because their cost of exit from business in case of failure is lower. When a risky project
fails, younger owner-managers are more likely to exit from the business for an alternative employment,
which makes them more risk-tolerant (Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn, 2009). We therefore hypothesize
Hypothesis 2. A CEOs age is positively associated with a rms survival.
Several factors can inuence the strength of the relationship between a CEOs age and rm growth
and performance. We examine three industry and environmental characteristics that can be expected
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to have a clear-cut e¤ect on the relationship: industry creativity, technological dynamism, and nancial
development.
Creative industries. The discussion above suggests that CEOs age can be particularly important
for rm growth and performance in specic industries. We begin with creative industries that supply
goods and services broadly associated with cultural, artistic, or entertainment value (e.g., advertising and
fashion). They are characterized by a high level of uncertainty in demand, risk (Caves, 2000; Townley
and Beech, 2010) and novelty, though not necessarily technological advancement (Power and Scott, 2004;
Stoneman, 2010).
In owner-managed rms, the human capital of top managers is often a key input. If their creativity
and propensity to change decline, we would expect the growth and performance of their rms to su¤er,
especially in creative industries. Psychological studies have found that the highest creativity values
are either attained by the youngest age groups (Ruth and Birren, 1985) or have an inverted U-shape
culminating before the age of 40 (Alpaugh and Birren, 1977; Levinson, 1989). Innovators and top scientists
are found to be more creative early in their careers (Galenson and Weinberg, 2000, 2001; Weinberg and
Galenson, 2005; Jones and Weinberg, 2011). Further, using the sample of the US publicly traded rms,
Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Celik (2014) show that younger CEOs tend to work with younger inventors; thus,
the e¤ect of a CEOs age may not be conned to his or her individual contribution. Also, team creativity
appears to be enhanced by young members (Packalen and Bhattacharya, 2015). As we focus on small
rms in which CEOs are also majority shareholders, it is important to stress that even when top managers
are not the ones to come up with original ideas, they are still the ones who approve or veto them. We
therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship of a CEOs age with rm investment, growth and performance
is stronger in creative industries.
Technologically dynamic industries. An environmental change is likely to require adaptation
(Thompson, 1967). However, the managerial cognition literature suggests that bounded rationality pre-
vents managers from developing a complete understanding of their rmsoperating environments (Bogner
and Barr, 2000). Managers focus their attention on those domains they consider to be most relevant,
while selectively ignoring others (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Bogner and
Barr, 2000; Fiol and OConnor, 2003). Thus, rms will not respond to environmental changes unless
those changes are noticed and perceived as important by managers (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). This is
particularly important in fast-changing environments, where CEOs need to process large quantities of am-
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biguous information to identify the most pressing issues. Older CEOs may be at a disadvantage in these
environments, as they may possess more established knowledge structures and preferences, resulting in
larger biases in dealing with incoming information. They may have a stronger commitment to status quo
and would rationalize the observed changes in the environment to t their view and make their previous
actions sensible (Daft and Weick, 1984). In addition, longer-tenured CEOs may receive narrower, more
nely ltered information from trusted internal sources (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991).
Building on this more nely ltered information, older CEOs may not see the need to recongure their
business.
By contrast, less dynamic environments could be more forgiving. They are characterized by less
dramatic and more predictable changes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). CEOs can gradually build and
improve their understanding of the environment over time, which could translate into better performance.
For example, Henderson et al. (2006) nd that rms in the relatively stable branded-foods industry
continued to steadily increase their performance over a CEOs tenure for about fteen years before it
started to decline gradually. Authors argue that in more stable industries the existing strategies could
stay relevant for longer without considerable penalties and could even benet from incremental ne-tuning.
We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. The negative e¤ect of a CEOs age on rm investment, growth and performance is
stronger in technologically dynamic industries.
Financial development. Growth may not be the major objective of rm owners managing the
rm (Chrisman, Chua and Zahra, 2003). The literature distinguishes between lifestyle rms and growth-
oriented rms. Lifestyle rms are set up to satisfy more personal goals of the owner whilst also providing
an adequate income, and growth-oriented rms are set up with the intent to expand. While family rm
owners as a broad category may prioritize family concerns over business concerns (Budge and Jano¤, 1991;
Whiteside and Brown, 1991), a substantial share of them may nevertheless be growth-oriented (Harvey
and Evans, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1993).
Owners that are not interested in growing the rm (perhaps because they are getting too old) may
choose to sell the rm. One of the channels through which nancial development could contribute to
growth is by facilitating ownership change. Financial development a¤ects the ability of potential investors
seeking to purchase a rm to obtain additional funding from either banks or private equity investors
(Giannetti, 2003). They will have better access to such resources in more nancially developed regions as
nancial development has been shown to enhance the probability of starting a business, to favor entry of
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new rms and to promote growth (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004).
Firm sale is likely to occur earlier in a owner-managers life if he or she can get a better deal. This,
in turn, can help to avoid the negative e¤ects associated with age. Thus, the nancial development of a
region promotes economic growth not only by providing better access to nance for start-ups, but also by
assisting ownership transfers from those who are less motivated and not interested in growing business to
those who are more motivated and ambitious. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5. Financial development moderates the negative e¤ect of a CEOs age on rm investment,
growth and performance by facilitating ownership transfers between younger and older CEOs.
3 Data
To empirically document the relationship between a CEOs age and the rms growth and performance,
we develop a new dataset on ownership and management of private rms operating in three countries of
Western Europe. We use data from Amadeus, a database maintained by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), which
contains ownership, management, and nancial information on European rms. BvD obtains its data
from regulatory lings, third-party vendors, and its own proprietary sources. Amadeus contains not only
detailed nancial information for both private and public rms, but also detailed ownership information
that includes the name of each shareholder, the number and type of shares held, and information on each
rms management and board of directors. We focus on the period from 2002 to 2012 to analyze rm
growth and performance, as well as rm exit and changes in ownership structure during this period.
We restrict our attention to rms that are managed and at least partially owned by the same person.
By focusing on owner-managed rms, we eliminate the potential agency problems from the separation of
ownership and control, which could a¤ect managerial actions and hence rm growth and performance.
To identify which CEOs are also rm owners, we developed a name-matching algorithm that compares
the list of rm managers to the list of rm owners. In the vast majority of cases, leading shareholders are
also listed as CEOs, especially for the smaller and younger rms in our sample.
Our matched sample includes 157,996 rms from France (33%), Great Britain (64%) and Italy. German
rms are excluded because small German rms are not required to disclose balance sheet information,
making it impossible to calculate nancial performance outcomes such as ROA. We retain only those
rms for which we have ownership and age information and we exclude rms for which we are unable to
identify at least 90% of the reported shareholders and those for which annual sales are not reported.
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A major contribution of our analysis is tracking private rms ownership changes over time. Of
the surviving rms, we have ownership information for 111,269 rm-years.4 For the rest, ownership
information is either missing or too incomplete to allow us to credibly determine the ownership structure.
We base our analysis of ownership changes on rms for which we have comprehensive ownership coverage
and base our analysis of rm growth and performance on the complete sample of 625,987 rm-years. To
address the concern that changes in rm outcomes may be driven by changes in management or ownership
rather than associated with the CEOs age, we also report the results for a clean subsample of rms with
no ownership and management changes in the robustness section of the paper.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables in our sample. The average rm has $3.2
million in assets, generates $6.0 million in sales, and has 31 employees. The average CEOs age is 50.6
(the median is 50.2) and the average rms age is 11 (the median is 7). Average prots over the period
from 2003-2012 are about $205,000 and ROA is 0.10. Average investment over the same period is 0.035
and the sales growth is 0.08. The correlation matrix is reported in the online supplement (Table OA1 ).
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 presents the distribution of assets and rm characteristics by the CEOs age. The top panel
demonstrates that rms with CEOs over 53 own the majority of assets in our sample: 25% of the assets
are owned by rms with CEOs between 54 and 59; 28% are owned by rms with CEOs 60 and older. As
we show later in the empirical analysis, these same two groups of rms experience the sharpest decline
in growth and performance. Table 2 also shows that rms with older CEOs are substantially larger and
older. However, ROA is lower for rms with the oldest CEOs than for any other age category and is less
than half the ROA for rms with the youngest CEOs.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 3 presents the distribution of CEOs ages by main industries. Firms in our sample are drawn
from a wide industry distribution. For ease of presentation, we aggregate the three-digit SIC codes into
broad industry-level categories.5 We manually classify industries as service or manufacturing, based on
4We check which types of rm have missing ownership information in 2011. Firms for which there is ownership information
are much larger than those for which there is no ownership information. Average sales for rms with ownership information
is $8.8 million; for those without, it is only $0.5 million. The same very large di¤erences are found when we examine assets
($5.9 million versus $0.4 million) and employment (39 versus 3). Thus, our analysis of ownership changes disproportionately
represents the larger rms in our sample.
5Details on our classication of SIC codes into main industry categories are available upon request.
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their text description. We nd that manufacturing rms generally have older CEOs (the average age
being 53.3 versus 49.8) and a higher incidence of CEOs over 59 (28 versus 18.7). The most represented
industries in our sample are construction (25,807 rms) and retail and apparel (11,928 rms). Other
common industries include engineering and architectural (8,587 rms), food stores and restaurants (6,814
rms) and real estate (6,594 rms). The incidence of rms with CEOs over 59-our samples 90th percentile-
varies from 15.6% in food stores and restaurants to 40.3% in chemicals.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4 Econometric Specications
Our main interest is in the relationship between CEO age and rm growth (rm investment and sales
growth) and performance (return on assets). We estimate the following specication for the relationship
between CEO age and changes in rm outcomes (i indexes rms):
yit = 1 lnAssetsit 1 + 2 lnFirmAgeit + 3 lnCEOAgeit + 'j + cc + it; (1)
yit denotes the outcome variable (rm investment, sales growth or ROA) of rm i at time t. CEO
Age is the age of rm owner-manager. We also control for assets and rm age. Controlling for rm age
is especially important due to the strong positive correlation between rm age and CEO age. Later we
report robustness checks where we break the sample by di¤erent rm age brackets and show that our
results continue to hold in each subsample. ' and c are complete sets of three-digit SIC codes and country
dummy variables.  is an iid error term.
In separate regressions we also replace CEO age with a set of dummies for di¤erent age brackets to
pick up a non-linear e¤ect in CEO age. These dummies are for the following age categories: less than
34 (10th percentile), 35-40 (10th percentile to 25th percentile), 41-46 (25th percentile to 50th percentile),
47-53 (50th percentile to 75th percentile), 54-59 (75th percentile to 90th percentile) and above 59. We
expect that outcomes would be more negative for older managers (b3 < 0).
Instrumental Variables. A potential concern is that ownership structures could be chosen based on
certain rm characteristics (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). For example, the better rms may be more
likely to have ownership transferred from an older CEO to a younger CEO at an earlier age, while rms
performing less well may not change their ownership and management. To address these concerns, we
use an instrumental variable strategy. Specically, we use the average age of the founder at the country,
industry, and year level at the time of rm founding to instrument the likelihood of old CEOs. The idea
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is that the level of experience needed to start a business varies by country, industry and year. The higher
the average age of the founder at the time of rm founding, the higher incidence of old CEOs observed
later in the sample. At the same time, the average age of the founder at founding would not correlate with
current rm growth and performance. Note that to account for rm-specic time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity we include rm xed e¤ects in all specications.
Survival analysis. We employ Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the e¤ect of CEO age
on the rm survival. The model is formulated as follows:
hi(tjXi) = h0(t) exp(Xi); (2)
where the hazard function for the ith rm, hi(tjXi), is conditional on covariates Xi. h0(t) is the
baseline hazard, which corresponds to the value of the hazard when all the predictors (Xi) are equal to
zero (hi(tjX = 0)). Covariates Xi include rm assets, rm age and a set of dummies for age categories.
The estimated exp() is the hazard ratio comparing the likelihood of the exit from business, for example,
for rms with young versus rms with old CEOs. A hazard ratio of 1.0 is then suggests that CEOs age
does not a¤ect business survival, holding all other variables constant. A hazard ratio lower (greater) than
1.0 suggests a lower (higher) likelihood of business failure.6
5 Estimation Results
5.1 CEO age and changes in rm outcomes
We start exploring the relationship between the CEOs age and rm outcomes by estimating basic regres-
sions. Table 4 presents the regression estimation results. We nd a clear negative relationship, which is
mostly linear and is strongly driven by the oldest CEO category in our sample.
Columns 1-5 show the results for investment. We nd that older CEOs invest less. Columns 1-4 include
a single continuous variable for the CEOs age. As expected, the coe¢ cient estimate on age is negative
and signicant. This result is robust to between rm estimation, 3-year di¤erencing, and inclusion of rm
xed e¤ects to control for time-invariant rm heterogeneity. Column 5 replaces the CEOs age with a set
of dummies for age categories. Using the youngest CEOs in our sample (34 or younger) as the omitted
base category, the coe¢ cient estimate on the dummies for the oldest CEO category is -0.451 (with a
standard error of 0.009), while the coe¢ cient estimate on the second-youngest CEO category is -0.071.
These estimates indicate that rms owned by the oldest category of CEOs invest 45 percentage points
6STATA statistical software package is used to conduct the analysis. Specically, we use areg command for the main
estimations; reghdfe command is used for the instrumental variable analysis; survival analysis is performed using stcox
command.
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less than rms owned by the youngest CEOs. We further conrm, using a Wald test, that the coe¢ cients
for the various age windows are statistically di¤erent from each other.7
Columns 6-10 examine age e¤ects for sales growth. As we did for investment, we nd a slower growth
in sales for CEOs aged 53 and above relative to younger CEOs. The coe¢ cient estimate for CEOs aged
54 to 59 is -0.389; it is -0.110 for CEOs aged 35 to 40. Thus, sales by older CEOs grow at a rate 28%
slower than the rate for younger CEOs. Our interpretation of the lower investment and slower growth in
sales for rms with older CEOs is that those managers have less incentive to invest in the rm due to
lower preference for growth. However, it is also possible that the observed decline in growth is in fact the
result of older owners liquidating their rms so they can retire.
To shed further light on the nature of the lower investment and slower growth in rm sales, we explore
the relationship between the CEOs age and rm performance. Columns 11-15 focus on ROA. We nd a
strong decline in ROA for the oldest CEO category. For CEOs 60 and older, ROA is 13.2% lower than
for the youngest CEO age category. Lower ROA together with lower investment and growth in sales are
consistent with Hypothesis 1.8
[Insert Table 4 here]
We further address the endogeneity concern by reestimating our main specication using an instru-
mental variable (IV) strategy. We use the average age of the founder at the industry, year and country
level at the time of rm founding to instrument the likelihood of old CEOs. Table 5 reports the estimation
results. In Column 2 we observe a strong negative age e¤ect on rm investment. The sign and magnitude
of the coe¢ cient estimated by IV model is similar to the one of OLS (Column 3). Same holds for growth
in sales (Columns 5-6) and ROA (Columns 8-9).9 Overall, the observed pattern is consistent with our
main estimations reported in Table 4.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We further investigate whether rms led by older CEOs exhibit higher survival rates. Table 6 studies
the relationship between rm survival and CEO age. Column 1 shows that the probability of rm exit
decreases as the age of a CEO increases (the estimated hazard ratio is 0.991 < 1). We control for rm
assets and rm age to ensure that results are not driven by younger rms, which have the highest failure
7The test results are available upon request.
8The potential concern is that the period of our study contains a period of considerable economic upheal which may limit
the generalizability of our results. We therefore reestimate our main specication for years before the crisis (2002-2007). The
sign and the magnitude of estimated coe¢ cients are in line with our main ndings. These results are available upon request.
9The results are also robust to employing the average age of the founder at the industry, year, country and gender level
at the time of rm founding as an instrument. These results are available upon request.
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rates. Model in Column 2 uses a dummy variable for age that equals to one if the CEO is younger than
30 years old at the year of incorporation and zero otherwise. Then, the estimated hazard rate of 1.357
implies that rms with CEOs younger than 30 years old are about 1.4 times more likely to exit business
than rms with CEOs of 30 years old and above. Column 3 presents more detailed age categories. The
base category is dened as rms with CEOs older than 59 (the oldest group). Firms with youngest CEOs
(18-25 years old) are nearly 1.5 times more likely to exit from business than rms led by the older CEOs
(60 and above). The likelihood of exit gradually decreases with the age of the CEO. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 2.
[Insert Table 6 here]
5.2 Mechanisms
There are several potential mechanisms through which the aging of a CEO could a¤ect rm growth and
performance. We examine industry variation by paying attention to creative and technological components
that could be crucial for aging CEOsrmsoutcomes, as put forth in Hypotheses 3 and 4.
5.2.1 CEO age and creativity
As creativity has been shown to decrease with age, the e¤ect of a CEOs age on rm growth could
be particularly pronounced in creative industries, including advertising, architecture, art, crafts, design,
fashion, lm, music, performing arts, publishing, research and development (R&D), software, toys and
games, radio, TV, and video games (Howkins, 2001).10 These industries are referred to as the creative
economy and account for a signicant share of gross value added. For example, according to the UK
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, creative industries accounted for ve percent of the total UK
gross value added in 2013.11
Estimation results are reported in Table 7. Overall, the results are consistent with our main estimations
higher CEOsage is associated with lower investment, lower growth in sales and lower ROA. However,
the impact of older CEOs on outcomes of rms operating in creative industries is more pronounced as
well. The coe¢ cient estimates for CEOs who are 60 and older in creative industries are -0.104 (with a
standard error of 0.019) for investment, -0.053 (with a standard error of 0.019) for changes in sales, and






-0.054 (with a standard error of 0.010) for ROA when compared to the youngest age category (34 or less).
These results support Hypothesis 3.
[Insert Table 7 here]
5.2.2 CEO age and technological dynamism
Creativity is important to innovation, but there is much more to the creation and commercialization of new
products and processes than creativity. Because these activities must be paid for, R&D expenditures or
the share of employment devoted to R&D have been used to measure innovative activity. Intensity of
R&D at the industry level characterizes an industrys technological dynamism. We use Eurostats industry
classication to measure technological dynamism and distinguish between manufacturing and service
industries. Aggregation of manufacturing industries is based on the R&D intensity (R&D expenditure
to value added) of economic activities. Economic sectors are classied as high-technology, medium-
high-technology, medium-low-technology, or low-technology. While direct R&D intensities are not useful
for service activities, those sectors are aggregated into knowledge-intensive services and less-knowledge-
intensive services, based on the share of tertiary-educated employees at the two-digit industry level.12
The estimation results are reported in Table 8. We do not nd support for Hypothesis 4 that the aging
of CEOs negatively a¤ects rm outcomes in technologically dynamic manufacturing industries. However,
rms that operate in knowledge-intensive and less knowledge-intensive service industries and whose CEOs
are 60 and older do have lower investment (about 3%), lower sales growth (about 4%) and lower ROA
(about 2%) than rms whose managers are younger than 60. This nding is consistent with our previous
result on creativity, as many knowledge-intensive service industries could be characterized as creative
because the problems faced by their clients are often unique, context-specic, and highly specialized
(Salter and Tether, 2006).
[Insert Table 8 here]
5.3 Regional nancial development
In this section, we present evidence that the incidence of rms with older CEOs is lower in regions
with higher nancial development. Then we examine a potential mechanism for this e¤ect, as posited in
Hypothesis 5: ownership transfer. Specically, we show that both ownership change and rm exit are
more likely in regions with higher nancial development, especially for rms with older owner-managers.
12The detailed Eurostat classication of manufacturing industries according to their techno-
logical intensity and service industries according to their knowledge intensity is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf
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Finally, we show that the decline in rm investment associated with older CEOs is less pronounced in
regions of high nancial development.
To study these issues, we exploit variation in credit availability across regions within Europe. A
challenge is that rms in Amadeus are not classied to regions. Nevertheless, for each rm we have
information on its city address. We use this information to manually match each rm/city to a region.
Regions are identied according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS).13
The data on nancial development that measures the ease of obtaining external nancing comes from
several sources.
Number of Financial Institutions. Information on the number of nancial institutions in each region
comes from Structural Business Statistics (SBS) provided by Eurostat. SBS collects information on credit
institutions, where a credit institution is an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account (SBS denition). All credit
institutions in this measure operate in the following business segments: other monetary institution
(NACE 65.12), and other nancial intermediation(NACE 65.2). The number of nancial institutions
varies considerably across regions, from as low as 283 to a high of 3,886 (the average number of nancial
institutions is 1,781, the median is 1,836). Because regions vary by size and population, in all regressions
we control for a regions geographical size and population. We also explore specications where we
normalize the number of nancial institutions by region size. The same pattern of results holds in the
normalized specications.
Financial Sector Productivity. Financial sector productivity is the ratio between total revenues by
nancial institutions in a region and number of nancial sector employees, and is from the European
Competitiveness Index 2006-07 report (Huggins and Davies, 2006).14 Financial sector productivity varies
from a low of 60,190 EU per employee to a high of 107,830 EU per employee (an average value of 77,092
and a median value of 69,389).
Private equity investment. Private equity investment data is from the statistical annexes of each
countrys private equity or venture capital association.15 Private equity investment varies a lot across
regions from as low as $9 million to a high of $3,590 million, The 25th percentile of investment is $418
million and the 75th percentile is $1,266 million (an average value of $1,337 million and a median value
of $556 million).
13For further details concerning the NUTS classication see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview
14Accessed through http://www.cforic.org/
15Country sources are the following. France: The French Private Equity Association (AFIC), https://www.ac-data.com/.
Great Britain: The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (BVCA). Numbers include all investments in a
year madeof advised bythe BVCA members regardless of whether the investing fund is domestic or overseas-based.
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5.3.1 Financial development and CEO age
We have shown that older CEOs are associated with lower investment, lower growth in sales, and lower
ROA. This is especially true in the service and creative industries in which the managers human capital
is more likely to matter. In this section, we explore how the likelihood of a rm having an older CEO is
a¤ected by the regional level of nancial development.
Table 9 shows how the share of assets and employees in rms with CEOs who are 60 and older varies
by regions with high and low nancial development. In regions with high nancial development, the share
of both assets and employment in rms with older CEOs is substantially lower. In particular, 23.4% of
assets are controlled by CEOs older than 59 in less nancially developed regions, compared to only 16.3%
in more nancially developed regions. We also nd that older CEOs employ 18.5% of the workers in less
nancially developed regions but only 12.7% in more nancially developed regions. In more nancially
developed regions, older CEOs in manufacturing industries control fewer assets and employ fewer workers
than older CEOs in service industries. No di¤erence is observed in less nancially developed regions.
[Insert Table 9 here]
In Table 10, we look at the same relation between regional nancial development and CEOs age in a
linear probability model. The dependent variable is a dummy for rms with CEOs who are 60 and older.
Columns 1-3 establish a strong negative relationship between regional nancial development and the
incidence of older CEOs. Column 1 presents the results for the number of nancial institutions in the
region. The estimated e¤ect is large: moving from the rst quartile to the forth quartile of number of
nancial institutions reduces the incidence of older CEOs by 3.2 percentage points, or 32% of the sample
mean. Columns 2 and 3 present the results for nancial sector productivity and the amount of private
equity investment, respectively. We nd similarly negative e¤ects for both. Taken together, these results
indicate that nancial development is associated with less assets managed by older CEOs. If nancial
markets reduce the prevalence of rms run by older CEOs because they increase asset tradability, we
would expect the negative e¤ect of nancial development to be stronger in industries in which assets,
being more tangible, are more likely to be traded across markets.
Columns 4-6 test this prediction by distinguishing between service and manufacturing industries.
We nd a negative and signicant coe¢ cient estimate on the number of nancial institutions for both
industry types; however, as expected, the coe¢ cient estimate for manufacturing is substantially larger in
absolute value (-0.035 versus -0.023). Column 6 includes an interaction between the number of nancial
institutions and a dummy for manufacturing industries and shows that the coe¢ cient estimate on the
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number of nancial institutions is signicantly larger in absolute value for manufacturing rms.
[Insert Table 10 here]
5.3.2 Financial development, ownership changes and exit
We next examine the relation between regional nancial development and the likelihood that rms change
ownership.
Columns 1-3 of Table 11 present linear probability models that examine the likelihood of ownership
change as a function of measures of nancial development, CEOs age, and other rm and geography
controls. We use three measures of nancial development: number of nancial institutions, nancial
sector productivity, and level of private equity investment. We nd that according to all three measures,
greater nancial development is associated with a greater likelihood of ownership change. Moving from
the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of the number of nancial institutions distribution increases
the probability of an ownership change by 17.4 percentage points, or 43% of the sample average. This
is consistent with the idea that more developed nancial markets facilitate the transfer of private asset
ownership and thus mitigate the negative e¤ect associated with older CEOs by allowing them to sell their
companies earlier.
In Columns 4-6 of Table 11, we explore the relationship between regional nancial development and
the likelihood that a rm exits the sample. If exits are an indicator of poor performance, we should expect
that in regions with more nancial development, we would observe fewer exits because nancial markets
facilitate more e¢ cient ownership structures through ownership changes. The negative coe¢ cients on our
three measures of nancial development suggest that this is the case. Lastly, we examine whether the
decline in rm investment as CEOs age is less severe in more nancially developed regions than in less
nancially developed regions. If nancial markets help CEOs sell their rms when it is e¢ cient to do so,
we should see higher investment in more developed nancial markets.
[Insert Table 11 here]
In Table 12, we run our main investment regressions on subsamples of rms in less nancially developed
regions (Columns 1-3) and in more nancially developed regions (Columns 4-6). Indeed, rm investment
is 30% lower for rms owned by CEOs who are 60 and older relative to CEOs aged 34 and younger in less
nancially developed regions, but only 20% lower in more nancially developed regions. This nding is
consistent with the idea that nancial development moderates the negative e¤ect of older CEOs on rm
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growth.
[Insert Table 12 here]
To aid in the comparison of coe¢ cients on the CEO-age categories across specications, Figure OA1
in the online supplement plots each coe¢ cient in the regressions in Table 12. Figure 1.a compares the
coe¢ cients for more and less nancially developed regions for rms in all industries. Figures 1.b and
1.c show the comparison for service and manufacturing industries, respectively. In all three gures, the
gap between more and less nancially developed regions increases when CEOs reach age 60 and above,
consistent with suboptimal management by older CEOs. We also formally test whether the observed
di¤erences in coe¢ cients are statistically signicant between more and less nancially developed regions
using seemingly unrelated model (suest command in Stata). The tests show that the coe¢ cient estimates
di¤er signicantly for CEOs older than 40 years old. These results are provided in Table OA2 of the
online supplement.
5.4 Robustness tests
In this section we examine the robustness of our main ndings to alternative subsamples and controls.
The tables are reported in the online supplement.
Managerial and ownership changes. As our sample spans over a relatively long time period (2003
2012), the potential concern is that CEOs move between rms and therefore may di¤er within rms from
one period to the next. To address this concern, we check the robustness of our main results on the
subsamples of rms with (i) no CEO changes (Columns 1-3, Table OA3 ) and (ii) no CEO and ownership
changes (Columns 4-6, Table OA3 ). The magnitude and sign of the estimated coe¢ cients mirror our
main results.
Omitted variables. Research based on upper echelons theory found that such attributes of top execu-
tives as tenure, educational level and functional experience could also be proxies for managerial cognition.
Educational level and functional experience do not change dramatically over time and therefore are taken
care of by controlling for rm xed e¤ects.16 We assume that CEOs do not move much between rms as
the businesses we are focusing on are owned by the CEOs. At the same time, rm-specic experience or
tenure of a manager is closely interrelated with the age of an executive. Tenure is often considered to be
representative of a variety of additional variables that are not associated with age. Therefore, omitting
tenure could potentially result in overestimation of the age e¤ect.
16We cannot control for these characteristics directly as the information about education and functional experience of a
manager is available for less than 1% of rms in our sample.
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We check the robustness of our main results by re-estimating our main specication on three sub-
samples based on CEO tenure under 5 years (the bottom quartile by tenure), between 5 and 11 years
(the interquartile tenure range), and over 12 (the top quartile by tenure). Table OA4 presents the
estimation results. We observe a strong negative relationship between CEOs age and investment and
sales growth, in all three subsamples. There is also a decline in rm performance, measured by ROA,
below the 75th percentile (tenure 11 years), but it is less pronounced. Further, substantial rm-specic
experience (above 12 years) seems to outweigh the negative e¤ect of age on rm performance (Column
9).
Firm age. Throughout the analysis, we have controlled for rm age, in addition to manager age, to
ensure that our results do not reect di¤erence in performance between younger and older rms. We
further test the robustness of our results by repeating our analysis on three sub-samples based on rm
age under 5 years (the bottom quartile by rm age), between 5 and 16 years (the interquartile rm age
range), and over 16 (the top quartile by rm age). Table OA5 presents the estimation results. We see
that for all rm ages higher CEO age is associated with lower investment and lower growth in sales. The
negative e¤ect of age on ROA is lower in magnitude for the set of oldest rms, but it is still present.
6 Conclusion
Using large-scale data on Western European small owner-managed rms, we show that rms run by older
CEOs exhibit lower investment, lower growth in sales and lower performance, as measured by ROA. The
negative e¤ect of older CEOs on rm outcomes is particularly pronounced in industries in which creativity
and human capital are important. We also nd that in more nancially developed markets, fewer rms
are owned by older CEOs and that the decline in rm performance associated with older CEOs is less
pronounced.
Our results contribute to research examining the e¤ects of top managers on rm growth and perfor-
mance. As CEOs grow older, they appear to become more conservative and less growth-oriented. This
is not to say that younger CEOs should be favored. We tend to think that higher average rm growth
and performance by younger CEOs is driven by adoption of higher-risk strategies. The industry analysis
provides some clues on which industries should favor younger CEOs and which should favor older CEOs.
For example, rms operating in industries that require managers to move fast and break things(e.g.,
creative industries) would benet from being led by younger CEOs, while others may extract more benets
from sustainable growth and performance associated with older CEOs in charge.
We further demonstrate that younger CEOs are more likely to exit business. This further support the
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assertion of younger managers adopting higher risk strategies. The observed higher average growth and
performance by younger CEOs come at the cost of higher returns volatility and, consequently, a higher
risk of failure. While rm exit does not necessarily imply rm bankruptcy, the likelihood of economic-
forced exits has been demonstrated to be signicantly higher than the likelihood of exits not related to
rm performance (Harada, 2007; Manso, 2016). Owner-managers of closely-held small private rms may
also decide to leave their rm because of disappointment with business ownership and unwillingness to
put up with limited success(Mayer and Goldstein, 1961). These exit reasons are more likely to appeal
to younger CEOs who have more external opportunities such as starting full-time education (Harada,
2007) or taking an alternative job (Taylor, 1999). We cannot formally di¤erentiate between di¤erent
alternatives for rm exit. We however believe that the likelihood of rm exit increases as the performance
decrease.
Our evidence also suggest that nancial development plays an important role in facilitating realloca-
tion of assets from rms with older CEOs that are not interested in growing their rms to rms with
younger CEOs. The lower growth and performance could be driven not only by changes in CEOsbe-
havior over time, but by the changes in the external environment that have accelerated as managers have
aged. A change of CEO that better ts with current situation could potentially improve rms perfor-
mance. This idea is known as t-drift/shift-ret situation (Finkelstein et al., 2009). While an initial
match of rm owner-manager with the external conditions facing the rm could be good, with time, the
environment either gradually drifts or radically shifts and therefore executives competencies match rms
needs less well. Once the manager retires or departs in any other way, there is an opportunity to ret
CEOs competencies with the new requirements of environment and rm. In less nancially developed
regions, older owner-managers would stay with their rms longer and have a larger mismatch between
competencies and rm needs. The opportunity to ret would come with the sale of the rm, making
nancial development that facilitates matching of owners with rms an important driver of rm growth
and performance.
While we use a large sample of rms over relatively long period of time, one limitation of our study is
that rms in focus are primarily from two Western European countries, namely, France and Great Britain.
Future research could explore the generalizability of our ndings across diverse institutional environments
and cultures as well as to what extent certain types of nancial markets and investors are most e¤ective at
facilitating the reallocation of assets from rms with older CEOs to rms with younger CEOs and in what
contexts. For example, are private equity investors and other types of activist investors most e¤ective at
facilitating managerial or ownership change (Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe, 2013), or are more
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arms length sources of nancing, such as bank nancing, enough to allow owner-managers to choose to
transfer control of their rms to younger generations.
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Variable Firms Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
CEO age 157,996 50.6 10.3 38 50 64
Assets ($,'000) 157,996 3,174 50,300 14 274 3,819
Sales ($,'000) 109,640 6,002 31,300 249 857 11,000
Number of employees 68,425 31 193 1 6 56
Firm age 157,996 11 11 3 7 24
Investment 157,996 0.035 0.745 -0.576 0.049 0.585
Sales growth 105,082 0.082 0.271 -0.146 0.063 0.333
Return on assets 108,951 0.101 0.325 -0.086 0.055 0.362
Table 1. Summary statistics
Distribution
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the main firm-level variables used in the econometric analysis. Unit of
observation is the firm. Firm age is years from date of incorporation. Return on assets is net income over assets. 
Investment is the annual change in log total assets. Sales growth is the annual change in log sales. Investment and Sales
growth are computed for each year from 2003 to 2012. Each firm's attributes are then averaged for all available years at
the firm-year level. 
CEO age: Age≤ 34 34<Age ≤ 40 40<Age ≤ 46 46<Age ≤ 53 53<Age ≤59 Age >59
Number of firms 11,237 22,132 39,286 33,494 27,438 24,409
Share of total assets by age 
bracket 1.9% 6.0% 23.0% 15.3% 25.6% 28.1%
Share of total employment by age 
bracket 3.4% 7.6% 27.0% 16.2% 19.7% 26.2%
Assets ($,'000) 864 1,370 2,941 2,288 4,672 5,779
Sales ($,'000) 2,994 3,397 6,116 4,783 6,971 10,042
Return on assets 0.128 0.136 0.102 0.124 0.073 0.055
Number of employees 14.4 16.5 33.2 23.3 34.6 51.8
Firm age 5.6 7.4 11.0 8.9 13.3 17.5
Table 2. Distribution of firm fharacteristics by CEO age
Average firm characteristics:
Notes: This table presents the distribution of firm characteristics by CEO age brackets. Unit of observation is the firm. 
Industry Number of firms Average CEO age % CEO age > 59
Total services 52,378 49.8 18.7
Total manufacturing 15,680 53.3 28.0
Advertising 1,323 49.3 16.3
Automotive repairs and services 2,943 50.2 17.6
Banking and finance 4,251 52.9 24.7
Car dealers 817 50.2 17.3
Chemicals 357 56.6 40.3
Construction 25,807 49.7 16.2
Education and social services 981 51.7 24.2
Engineering and architectural 8,587 51.7 22.5
Food stores and restaurants 6,814 48.8 15.6
Health services 1,575 50.9 22.5
Hotels 1,267 54.0 32.0
Industrial machines 1,935 53.3 27.9
Metals and minerals 519 53.9 30.6
Paper lumber and furniture 1,263 52.2 24.3
Personal services 4,401 51.3 23.1
Real estate 6,594 53.7 31.0
Retail and apparel 11,928 51.0 21.8
Transportation services 5,457 51.7 23.9
Table 3. Distribution of CEO age by main industries
Notes: This table presents the distribution of CEO age by main industries. Industries are classified as 
services or manufacturing manually based on their description. For ease of presentation, we manually 
group industries into main categories based on multiple two-digit SIC codes. 














differenced Firm FE Firm FE
ln(CEO age ) -0.079 -0.180 -0.500 -1.221 -0.089 -0.133 -1.093 -1.402 -0.072 -0.120 -0.176 -0.390
(0.003) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.025) (0.018) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
Dummy for CEO age ≤ 34 (base)
Dummy for 34 < CEO age ≤ 40 -0.071 -0.110 -0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Dummy for 40 < CEO age ≤ 46 -0.253 -0.294 -0.081
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Dummy for 46 < CEO age ≤ 53 -0.157 -0.200 -0.054
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Dummy for 53 < CEO age ≤ 59 -0.350 -0.385 -0.108
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Dummy for CEO age > 59 -0.451 -0.481 -0.132
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
ln(Assets ) -0.023 0.079 0.173 -0.254 -0.262 0.001 0.013 0.142 -0.199 -0.229 -0.023 -0.009 0.045 -0.022 -0.027
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Firm age ) -0.021 -0.112 -0.057 -0.057 -0.020 -0.025
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
Country dummies Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
R2 0.092 0.081 0.138 0.402 0.395 0.104 0.048 0.031 0.327 0.318 0.081 0.097 0.015 0.600 0.599
Observations 619,563 144,135 336,340 625,987 625,987 463,632 105,103 195,394 462,459 462,459 470,063 136,142 258,344 470,742 470,742
 
Investment Sales growth Return on assets  
Table 4. CEO age and firm outcomes
Notes : This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how firm outcomes are related to manager age. The dependent variables are computed for the period 2002-2012, and the level of analysis is at the firm-
year level. Investment  and Sales growth measure the change in log total assets, log sales from the previous year to the focal year. Return on assets  is calculated as net income over total assets for the focal year.  The 3-
year differenced result for ROA (Column 13) is the log change in ROA between the focal year (t) and t-3 year. All specifications control for log of total assets in the previous year. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust 
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity.




stage, IV OLS First stage
Second 




Dummy for CEO age >59 -1.154 -0.190 -0.777 -0.124 -0.267 -0.026
Instrument (0.169) (0.010) (0.197) (0.011) (0.071) (0.007)
ln(Industry-year average founder 
age at founding ) 0.110 0.110 0.185
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls
Dummy for CEO age ≤ 34 (base)
Dummy for 34 < CEO age ≤ 46 -0.461 -0.494 -0.076 -0.463 -0.361 -0.052 -0.434 -0.110 -0.007
(0.001) (0.078) (0.006) (0.001) (0.091) (0.007) (0.001) (0.031) (0.005)
Dummy for 46 < CEO age ≤ 49 -0.768 -0.840 -0.159 -0.773 -0.579 -0.089 -0.754 -0.203 -0.023
(0.000) (0.130) (0.008) (0.001) (0.152) (0.009) (0.001) (0.053) (0.006)
Dummy for 49 < CEO age ≤ 53 -0.641 -0.689 -0.127 -0.646 -0.488 -0.074 -0.619 -0.165 -0.019
(0.001) (0.108) (0.007) (0.001) (0.127) (0.008) (0.001) (0.044) (0.005)
Dummy for 53 < CEO age ≤ 59 -0.882 -0.988 -0.176 -0.885 -0.669 -0.102 -0.875 -0.237 -0.026
(0.000) (0.149) (0.009) (0.000) (0.174) (0.010) (0.000) (0.062) (0.007)
ln(A ssets) 0.002 -0.249 0.272 0.008 -0.178 0.203 0.005 0.090 0.092
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
   ln(Firm age) 0.143 -0.049 -0.415 0.145 -0.194 -0.499 0.133 -0.069 -0.122
(0.000) (0.025) (0.003) (0.000) (0.029) (0.003) (0.000) (0.010) (0.002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.985 0.345 0.384 0.983 0.247 0.342 0.984 0.572 0.611
Observations 587,781 587,781 611,039 441,754 441,754 454,964 446,612 446,612 463,180
Notes : This table presents the results of regressions examining the robustness of our results to potential endogeneity concerns. Dummy for the oldest CEO age category 
is instrumented by average age of the founder at the SIC-year-country level. All specifications control for log of total assets in the previous year.  Standard errors (in 
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms.
Table 5. Instrumental variable estimation





Dummy for CEO age ≤ 30 1.357
(0.050)
Dummy for 18 ≤ CEO age ≤ 25 1.464
(0.115)
Dummy for 25 < CEO age ≤ 30 1.432
(0.053)
Dummy for 30 < CEO age ≤ 34 1.236
(0.037)
Dummy for 34 < CEO age ≤ 40 1.131
(0.025)
Dummy for 40 < CEO age ≤ 53 1.058
(0.023)
Dummy for 53 < CEO age ≤ 59 0.991
(0.026)
Dummy for 59 CEO age (base=1)
ln(Assets ) 1.016 1.015 1.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Firm age ) 0.234 0.231 0.233
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log-Likelihood Ratio -180,750.6 -180,774.1 -180,730.1
χ2 30,044.5 29,997.6 30,085.5
Exits (total) 17,202 17,202 17,202
Observations 143,290 143,290 143,290
Table 6. CEO age and firm exit
Notes : This table presents the hazard ratios from a Cox Proportional Hazard regression 
of exit rates of 143,290 firms by CEO age. The risk set consists of firms that were 
founded between 2002 and 2011, the event is firm exit, and the hazard ratios are 
estimated on an annual basis. Exit year is defined as the last year beyond which the 
following firm attributes are unobserved in the BvD database: sales, income, total assets, 
employment, cash flow, profits before tax, or profit margin (there are 17,202 total 
observed exits from 2002 to 2011). CEO age is defined as the age of the CEO at the year 
of incorporation.
Dummy for exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
ln(CEO age ) -0.616 -0.547 -0.997
(0.027) (0.031) (0.018)
× C reative -0.083 -0.137 -0.100
(0.026) (0.029) (0.017)
Dummy for 34 < CEO age ≤ 40 -0.029 -0.034 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
× Creative -0.059 -0.026 -0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008)
Dummy for 40 < CEO age ≤ 46 -0.086 -0.064 -0.014
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008)
× Creative -0.090 -0.038 -0.037
(0.017) (0.018) (0.009)
Dummy for 46 < CEO age ≤ 53 -0.067 -0.050 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007)
× Creative -0.076 -0.036 -0.028
(0.016) (0.017) (0.009)
Dummy for 53 < CEO age ≤ 59 -0.092 -0.068 -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008)
× Creative -0.102 -0.052 -0.044
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010)
Dummy for CEO age > 59 -0.099 -0.089 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
× Creative -0.104 -0.053 -0.054
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010)
ln(Assets) 0.270 0.270 0.203 0.202 0.092 0.089
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Firm age) -0.345 -0.411 -0.422 -0.497 -0.101 -0.099
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.390 0.390 0.342 0.342 0.612 0.644
Observations 619,563 619,563 462,459 462,459 470,742 470,742
Table 7. CEO age and creative industries
Notes : This table presents the results of FE regressions examining how firm outcomes are related to CEO age in creative 
industries. The dependent variables are computed for the period 2002-2012, and the level of analysis is at the firm-year 
level. Investment  and Sales growth  measure the change in log total assets and log sales respectively from the previous 
year to the focal year. Return on assets  is calculated as net income over total assets for the focal year. All specifications 
control for log of total assets in the previous year. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Investment Sales growth Return on assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
ln(CEO age ) -0.176 -0.314 -0.023
(0.050) (0.065) (0.032)
× High-technology -0.549 -0.385 -0.197
(0.110) (0.132) (0.062)
× Medium-high-technology -0.406 -0.242 -0.111
(0.063) (0.077) (0.036)
× Medium-low-technology -0.262 -0.097 -0.087
(0.073) (0.086) (0.045)
× Low-technology -0.379 -0.084 -0.045
(0.067) (0.081) (0.040)
× Knowledge-intensive services -0.620 -0.523 -0.231
(0.049) (0.063) (0.032)
× Less knowledge-intensive services -0.448 -0.153 -0.273
(0.051) (0.064) (0.032)
Dummy for CEO age > 59 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
× High-technology -0.020 -0.096 -0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.013)
× Medium-high-technology -0.010 -0.027 0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008)
× Medium-low-technology -0.023 -0.015 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
× Low-technology 0.025 -0.009 -0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
× Knowledge-intensive services -0.033 -0.041 -0.016
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
× Less knowledge-intensive services -0.030 -0.012 -0.018
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
ln(Assets ) 0.270 -0.249 0.204 0.179 0.089 0.103
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Firm age) -0.345 -0.220 -0.421 -0.484 -0.077 -0.135
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.390 0.404 0.343 0.354 0.644 0.625
Observations 619,563 619,563 462,459 462,459 470,742 470,742
Table 8. CEO age and technological dynamism
Notes : This table presents the results of FE regressions examining how firm outcomes are related to CEO age in technologically 
dynamic industries. The dependent variables are computed for the period 2002-2012, and the level of analysis is at the firm-year 
level. Investment and Sales growth measure the change in log total assets and log sales respectively from the previous year to the 
focal year. Return on assets is calculated as net income over total assets for the focal year. All specifications control for log of 
total assets in the previous year. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Investment Sales growth Return on assets
Regional financial development: 
All Services Manufacturing All Services Manufacturing
Share of total assets by CEOs 
older than 59 23.4% 23.4% 23.2% 16.3% 16.6% 14.8%
Share of total assets by CEOs 
age 53 to 59 25.3% 24.8% 27.3% 44.3% 48.0% 25.1%
Share of total assets by CEOs 
age 46 to 53 25.3% 25.5% 25.1% 16.6% 14.6% 27.6%
Share of total assets by CEOs 
age 40 to 46 17.9% 18.1% 17.2% 13.2% 12.0% 18.9%
Share of total assets by CEOs 
age 34 to 40 8.1% 8.2% 7.2% 9.6% 8.8% 13.6%
Share of total employment by 
CEOs older than 59 18.5% 17.5% 20.9% 12.7% 13.0% 12.2%
Low financial development High financial development
Notes: This table shows how the share of assets and employment in firms with CEOs of age 60 and above varies by region financial development. 
Regions are classified to high and low financial development based on the median value on number of financial institutions in a region. 
Table 9. Share of assets and employment in old-CEO firms by regional financial development 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
All All All Services
Manu-
facturing All
ln(Number of financial institutions ) -0.029 -0.023 -0.035 -0.024
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Financial sector productivity -0.26
(0.059)
ln(Private equity investment ) -0.016
(0.005)
ln(Number of financial institutions ) × 
Dummy for manufacturing -0.011
(0.002)
ln(GDP ) 0.050 0.138 0.018 0.05 0.052 0.051
(0.031) (0.065) (0.046) (0.026) (0.042) (0.029)
ln(Size ) 0.000 -0.022 -0.016 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
ln(Population ) 0.001 0.005 0.029 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
ln(Assets ) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(Firm age ) 0.086 0.087 0.086 0.084 0.1 0.087
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.078 0.076 0.072 0.071 0.089 0.076
Observations 92,405 110,195 110,195 86,323 23,872 110,195
Table 10. Regional financial development and CEO age
Notes : This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the how the incidence of older CEOs vary by 
regional financial development. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow 
for serial correlation through clustering by regions.
Dummy for CEO age > 59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
ln(Number of financial institutions ) 0.067 -0.048
(0.014) (0.014)
Financial sector productivity 0.651 -0.407
(0.125) (0.130)
ln(Private equity investment ) 0.047 -0.029
(0.012) (0.009)
ln(GDP ) -0.006 -0.224 0.058 0.011 0.128 -0.051
(0.093) (0.163) (0.129) (0.104) (0.175) (0.137)
ln(Size ) 0.023 0.083 0.069 -0.019 -0.06 -0.051
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027)
ln(Population ) -0.024 -0.038 -0.098 0.017 0.029 0.068
(0.020) (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029)
ln(CEO age ) -0.006 -0.008 -0.022 -0.049 -0.044 -0.036
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
ln(Assets ) 0.027 0.025 0.023 -0.029 -0.028 -0.027
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(Firm age ) -0.03 -0.028 -0.025 -0.014 -0.016 -0.019
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.033 0.031 0.026 0.050 0.046 0.043
Observations 48,950 48,950 48,950 110,195 110,195 110,195
Notes : This table presents estimation results of how the incidences of ownership change varies by region financial 
development and CEO age.  Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by regions.
Table 11. Regional financial development, CEO age and ownership change
Dummy for ownership change Dummy for exit






Dummy for CEO age ≤ 34 (base)
Dummy for 34 < CEO age ≤ 40 -0.096 -0.099 -0.077 -0.069 -0.072 -0.062
(0.015) (0.019) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021)
Dummy for 40 < CEO age ≤ 46 -0.164 -0.157 -0.199 -0.101 -0.098 -0.110
(0.008) (0.011) (0.034) (0.007) (0.004) (0.023)
Dummy for 46 < CEO age ≤ 53 -0.235 -0.228 -0.264 -0.146 -0.146 -0.148
(0.009) (0.011) (0.035) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
Dummy for 53 < CEO age ≤ 59 -0.272 -0.266 -0.301 -0.216 -0.216 -0.218
(0.013) (0.018) (0.034) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024)
Dummy for CEO age > 59 -0.300 -0.290 -0.343 -0.200 -0.203 -0.191
(0.018) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.011) (0.040)
ln(GDP ) 0.063 0.048 0.137 0.031 0.027 0.048
(0.109) (0.108) (0.114) (0.049) (0.082) (0.065)
ln(Size ) 0.001 -0.005 0.035 -0.011 -0.016 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020)
ln(Population ) -0.045 -0.040 -0.061 -0.009 -0.003 -0.027
(0.049) (0.048) (0.064) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017)
ln(Assets) -0.000 -0.008 0.035 0.000 -0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(Firm age ) 0.001 0.002 -0.010 -0.064 -0.059 -0.078
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Three-digit SIC code dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.027 0.025 0.048 0.042 0.040 0.046
Observations 41538 34451 7087 51042 38400 12642
Low financial development High financial development 
Table 12. Changes in firm assets by CEO age and region financial development 
Dependent variable: Investment
Notes : This table presents the results of OLS regressions that examine how the relationship between firm 
investment and CEO age varies by region financial development. Investment is computed over the period 2006-
2010. CEO age is for 2006. Regions are classified to high and low financial development based on median 
value of  number of financial institutions in the region. We exclude firms that changed ownership in the period 
2006-2010. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by firms.
